Shadow banking in China is mainly conducted by banks to evade the excessive credit control, which constitutes a dual-track approach to liberalize the country's rigid interest rate policy. The market track of shadow banking can lead to efficiency gain by allowing credit resale to fund the more productive yet credit-deprived private enterprises (PEs). Pareto improvement can be achieved as the banks and state owned enterprises (SOEs) participate in shadow banking and share the efficiency gain. Full interest rate liberalization may not lead to additional efficiency gain, as it magnifies the credit mis-allocation in favor of the less productive SOEs.
Introduction
Interest rate policy in China has been exercised through price control over bank deposit rate and quota control over bank loan volume, as banks dominate the country's financial system. This policy remains one of the root causes for economic imbalance and structural distortions in China, but has never been fundamentally reformed. 1 The main objection comes from banks and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), because they fear to become reform losers if deprived of the privileges under the credit control regime. Moreover, the regulators also worry that the traditional banking system is ill-equipped to compete and survive in an interest rate sensitive market environment. Therefore, formulating a practical reform strategy to liberalize the interest rate policy presents a monumental challenge for Chinese decision markers, especially to achieve a broad consensus.
Shadow banking in China has experienced spectacular growth since 2007-2009 global financial crisis. 2 Two features distinguish China's shadow banking from its Western counterparts: (1) it is dominated by banks; and (2) it has tacit endorsement from the government. Banks take a leading role in shadow banking, in order to evade regulatory controls over interest rate and loan volume. They issue off-balance-sheet wealth management products (WMPs) to depositors and make trust loans to borrowers. Banks also serve as intermediary for large corporations, mainly SOEs, to issue entrust loans to mostly private enterprises (PEs). About two-thirds of the business flow in shadow banking are 1 We provide an overview of the interest rate policy in China in Section 2.1.2. The economic imbalance and distortions include over-investment, policy-driven business cycle, high and volatile inflation, capital mis-allocation to the state-owned sector, and lack of financing to the private sector. The financial and fiscal decentralizations have led to a transition from a credit plan regime to a credit control regime in China (Brandt and Zhu, 2000) . Also credit control has been loosening gradually over time. However, the controls over deposit interest rate and bank loan volume effectively remain today, via formal and informal guidance from the central bank and other regulatory agencies.
2 The People's Bank of China (PBC) defines China's shadow banking sector as credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking sector, which provides liquidity and credit transformation, and can potentially be a source of systemic risk or regulatory arbitrage. The shadow banking practice in China involves quite different yet much simpler financial products compared the Western shadow banking. According to Adrian and Ashycraft (2012) and Adrian, Covitz and Liang (2013) , the typical shadow banking products in the U.S. include asset-backed commercial papers, tri-party repurchase agreements, money market funds, asset-backed securities (ABSs) through securitization, and dealer-intermediated finance.
effectively "bank loans in disguise" (Elliott, Kroeber and Qiao, 2015) .
Shadow banking in China essentially constitutes a dual-track reform design to liberalize the country's interest rate policy. The notion of dual-track reform mechanism in this context begins with a preexisting control credit track, where deposit rate and loan volume are depressed below equilibrium. Then, a market track of shadow banking is introduced to allow agents to have additional credit demand or supply satisfied at the market interest rates. One advantage of the dual-track mechanism is that it does not require dismantling or restructuring the existing system and institutions, and thus, reduces the likelihood of economic instability. In this paper, we develop a simple market equilibrium model to examine China's shadow banking from the perspective of economic reform mechanism.
The dual-track approach to interest rate liberalization can lead to efficiency gain through a joint effect of more efficient credit allocation and less capital idolization. The former is unique to the Chinese economy, while the latter is common to shadow banking in general. Under the control track of bank credit, interest rate repression leads to excessive credit demand. Given banks' dominance in the financial system, loan quota is imposed to avoid credit flooding, resulting in capital idolization and relative short-supply of credit.
Banks ration the cheap credit in favor of less productive SOEs, partly because SOEs have implicit government guarantee (Brandt and Zhu, 2001; Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2011) , while more productive PEs are insufficiently funded by bank credit. After the rise of shadow banking, capital idolization moderates as households switch from deposits to WMPs, reducing the amount of social financing subject to stringent lending constraint and high reserve requirement ratio (RRR). Output increases as shadow banking credit, including credit resale by SOEs, flows to more productive yet under-funded PEs.
Pareto improvement can be achieved under the dual-track mechanism. PEs and households benefit unconditionally from the interest rate liberalization, as PEs obtain the option to borrow additional credit while households obtain the option to invest in WMP for higher return. Banks and SOEs are potential reform losers, if banks's interest margin shrinks due to competition while SOEs lose assess to low cost credit. However, dual-track mechanism allows banks and SOEs to participate in the market track of shadow banking and therefore to share efficiency gain from the PEs' high productivity. The gains shared by banks and SOEs can fully compensate their reform losses, under reasonable conditions. Thus, dual-track liberalization can have the least opposition from banks and SOEs, which still dominate the Chinese economy and financial system.
We show that, compared with the current dual-track liberalization, full interest rate liberalization that removes binding deposit rate ceiling and loan quota may not necessarily lead to additional efficiency gain. As the controls being removed, more capital flows back to the banking sector. This magnifies the credit mis-allocation problem by banks in favor of the less efficient SOEs, which adversely affects the aggregate output. Capital idolization also increases as more deposit is subject to the reserve requirement. This finding highlights the importance of joint reforming both banks and SOEs.
Numerical simulations from the extended baseline model-more resembling the reality in Chinese financial system-confirm the analytical results mentioned above. Moreover, the efficiency gain from dual-track interest rate liberalization increases with the degrees of controls on deposit rate and loan volume. The effect of shadow banking on output gain depends critically on bond market (direct financing) efficiency-less efficient bond market implies more efficiency gain from dual-track interest rate liberalization. Lin (1992) and Lau, Qian and Roland (2000) study dual-track reforms in the agricultural and industrial sectors in China. 3 Our finding shares the same insight-when facing multiple distortions, pragmatic dual-track reform (second best) may outperform full marketization reform (first best) in achieving Pareto improvement. However, the dual-track reforms in real sectors rely on forced execution of the plan track to guarantee Pareto improvement (Lau, Qian and Roland, 2000) , while in financial sector it is achieved by credit transfer or resale from SOEs to PEs through shadow banking. Intermediaries play trivial roles in real sector reforms but are critical in financial sector reforms (Brandt and Zhu, 2000) . Our work is related to Vishny (2012, 2013) in that shadow banking improves welfare but exposes financial system to greater risks. Our focus is on how shadow banking functions as an integral part of transitioning credit system to liberalize China's rigid interest rate policy in a pragmatic manner.
Recently, Funke, Mihaylovski and Zhu (2015) study the interactions among nonstandard monetary policy, the traditional banking sector, and the shadow bank sector in China with a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Hachem and Song (2016) relate asymmetric competition in the bank sector to the rise of shadow banking in China.
Our paper models shadow banking as a reform mechanism, with implications relevant for financial liberalization in other transitioning economies. We also provide a useful framework to analyze shadow banking as an integral part of a country's credit system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews China's interest rate policy, bank sector, and the rise of shadow banking. Section 3 introduces the baseline model. Section 4 analyzes the theoretical results. Section 5 presents the extended baseline model and numerical simulations. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional Background
This section gives an overview of China's interest rate policy, banking sector, and shadow banking. It provides an important context for understanding the role of shadow banking in the process of interest rate liberalization in China under the dual-track framework.
China's Interest Rate Policy
Interest rates have been rigidly controlled in China since the era of planned economy. The price-based and quantity-based controls are exercised through bank regulations because banks dominate China's credit system. Price-based control involves maximum deposit rate and minimum loan rate that were imposed to create a wealth transfer from savers to borrowers (Lardy, 2008) , and to ensure banks to have healthy profit margins. 4 Repressing interest rates below the equilibrium leads to excessive demand for credit, over-investment, and high inflation. To maintain price and economic stability, quantity-based control is exercised by limiting bank loan volume, which is largely equivalent to controlling overall money supply. Banks were not allowed to lend funds more than 75% of their deposit volumes prior to October 2015. The People's Bank of China (PBC) requires banks to hold substantial deposit reserve at time-varying but high levels. 5 Banks receive formal and informal guidance from the PBC and other government officials, e.g., to limit or boost lending to certain sectors whose growth the government intends to influence.
Formation of China's Interest Rate Policy
Interest rate repression was formed to facilitate China's early economic growth strategy, which prioritized the development of heavy industries in the 1950's (Lin, 1990; Lin and Zhou, 1993) . 6 Heavy industries are capital-intensive, while capital was by then the scarcest production resource. China artificially kept interest rates below the equilibrium to reduce the price of capital. In addition, exchange rates were set artificially high to enable heavy industries to import at low cost at the expense of primary product exportation. Wage and material prices were also repressed to allow heavy industries to generate high profit margins. Enterprises were nationalized to ensure that profits were retained in heavy industries. Price repression inevitably leads to resource shortage. To solve the problem, a highly centralized planning economy was established to secure resource allocation in favor of heavy industries. 4 Official minimum loan rate and maximum deposit rate were removed in 2013 and 2015, respectively. However, bank deposit and lending rates are still effectively controlled through substantial window guidance today.
5 As of February 2015, the required reserve ratios (RRRs) for large depository institutions, small and medium banks, and rural credit cooperatives and small financial institutions are 19.5%, 17.5%, and 16.0%, respectively.
6 There were several reasons to prioritize the development of heavy industries: (1) China needed to quickly establish a nation-wide defense system given its geopolitical environment in the 1950's; (2) impoverished agricultural economy could not provide necessary market conditions for the debut of economic development; (3) heavy industries have the advantage of consuming their own outputs to self-sustain growth at the initial stage of development. Same strategy was also adopted by the former Soviet Union, India, and Eastern European and Latin American countries in their early economic development.
China established a complete heavy industry system and achieved high-speed economic growth during 1949-1956. However, the strategy of prioritizing the development of heavy industries was costly and unsustainable. Surplus transfered from other industries and households was gradually exhausted, i.e., the agriculture and consumer sectors experienced almost no growth during the same period of time. Most households remained impoverished in the face of low wealth accumulation. On the other hand, excessive output of heavy industries could not be afforded for consumption by other underdeveloped industries and financially constrained households. Economic growth stagnated over the period of 1956-1979, and then, reforms became inevitable in China.
China has gradually transitioned from planned economy to market economy since 1979. State-controlled procurement system of agricultural and industrial products was demolished (Lin, 1992; Lau, Qian and Roland, 2000) . Prices of labor and almost all goods are market-based today. PEs have emerged and grown rapidly since the 1980's. Some SOEs have been partially privatized and publicly listed since the 1990's (Sun and Tong, 2003) . The split-share structure reform granted legitimate trading right to state-owned shares in the secondary markets, paving way for further privatization (Liao, Liu and Wang, 2014) . However, interest rates have remained repressed and been under tight control (Brandt and Zhu, 2000) , until very recently. We discuss below the problems caused by interest rate repression, followed by the reasons for lack of reform.
Problems Caused by Interest Rate Repression
Interest rate repression is one of the root causes of the structural imbalance and distortions of the Chinese economy. Interest rates below the equilibrium naturally induce incentive to invest excessively. Cheap credit flows into capital-intensive industries, e.g., steel and coal mining, and inefficient state-owned sector, resulting in over capacity and pollution. Interest rate repression leads to the co-movements of investment and consumption demands in the same direction, resulting in excessively volatile aggregate demand.
Interest rate repression presents a major challenge for the monetary policy by fueling policy-driven economic cycles in China. A boom typically starts with simultaneous increases in investment and consumption as the government looses investment restrictions in certain sectors. Bank credit is expanded to meet rapidly rising demand. After experiencing rapid growth for a couple of years, the economy becomes over-heated due to credit over-supply.
Inflation rises as demand for resources and services exceeds their supply. Brandt and Zhu (2000) show that growth rate and inflation move in tandem in China.
To tame inflation, monetary and administrative policies are tightened to prevent the economy from overheating, which may threaten economic and social stability. PBC orders banks to suddenly reduce credit supply, and the government reimpose limits on the price increases of agricultural products. Both investment and consumption drop dramatically, risking an economic hard-landing. The government cannot balance its budget if the economic growth falls below a threshold for a prolonged period of time. This fiscal pressure leads to softening of administrative restrictions on investment in some sectors and easing of the monetary tightening. A new round of policy-driven economic cycle begins.
Despite these well-known problems, the interest rate policy has never been fundamentally reformed. 7 Lack of reform comes mainly from the policy makers, who fear that premature financial sector reform may bring economic and social instability before the economic micro-foundation is ready. Banks and SOEs worry to lose their privileged positions and oppose financial reform. Banks are used to extract high profit margins from the repressed deposit rates and ill-equipped with modern risk management tools and skills.
SOEs enjoy ample cheap credit and have never operated in an interest-sensitive market environment. Without a fully-functioning bond market, monetary policy is more effectively transmitted through interest rate controls, rather than through financial markets (Zhou, 2009 ). Therefore, interest rate liberalization in China requires a gradual approach to overcome resistance from the vested interests and to coordinate with other financial market reforms.
Banking Sector in China
Banks dominate China's financial system with an unrivaled customer base including SOEs.
Under the controlled credit system, almost all lending was carried out through banks.
There were few legal alternatives to bank deposit for households savings, because of the underdeveloped bond and equity markets and closed capital accounts. Bonds are also largely held by banks. Banks benefit from an official guarantee on their deposits. 8
The government effectively controls all large banks through majority shareholding.
Executives at the biggest banks are appointed by the government. Banks receive formal instructions and informal guidances from the central bank and other regulators. Although the official loan floor rate and deposit ceiling rate were removed in 2013 and 2015, respectively, bank deposit rate is still effectively controlled by the government, and bank loan quota remains official and binding. Therefore, the bank credit system in China is a controlled system, although not a strict planning system (Brandt and Zhu, 2000) .
Banks can make discretionary loan decisions, but choose to ration credit in favor of SOEs that are backed by implicit government guarantee. Some SOEs also enjoy monopoly positions and have very low credit risks. Banks' internal reward system also encourages lending to SOEs, e.g., making bad loans to SOEs is unlikely to be punished severely, due to implicit government guarantee. As a result, banks are less inclined to lend to PEs, especially small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have high credit risk and lack quality collaterals. It appears to be a global issue that PEs and SMEs are insufficiently funded, but the situation is much more severe in China because of banks' conscious decision to allocate credit in favor of SOEs.
Shadow Banking in China
Shadow banking in China experienced explosive growth after the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. 9 Banks conduct shadow banking activities to evade binding regulatory controls.
In particular, banks raise capital through WMPs to bypass deposit rate ceiling and high reserve requirement, and subsequently make trust loans to bypass regular loan quota.
Banks also serve as intermediaries to make entrust loans on behalf of large corporations.
Banks assume the core positions in shadow banking transactions, taking the majority of risks and profits. Non-bank institutions are involved to help bypass regulatory restrictions and reduce costs. 10
The "bank-initiated" shadow banking practice must be understood in the context of banks' dominance in the credit system. Banks have a sheer advantage over other financial institutions in accessing individual and institutional savings. Historically, only state-owned banks were allowed to take deposits. Banks inherit such a huge customer base even though they went public since 2004. Before a formal deposit insurance was announced in 2015, bank deposit had implicit government guarantee. The scope of the guarantee, however, was vague, leading to the perception that the government will bail out the entire bank in the event of insolvency. Banks take advantage of this perception to raise WMPs at low cost, which is not possible for other shadow banking products issued by non-bank financial institutions.
Why did shadow banking only take off in the recent years, while the regulatory regime has been in place since the 1980's? During recent years, increasingly binding credit controls 9 Table 1 shows that the volume of entrust loans (trust loans) increased from 270 (83) billion yuan in 2006 to 2,547 (1,840) billion yuan in 2013, constituting from 6.3% (14.7%) to 1.9% (10.6%) of aggregate financing to the real economy in 2006 (2013), respectively. In contrast, the sizes of corporate debt and equity were 1,811 and 222 billion yuan in 2013, respectively. The ratio of domestic loans to aggregate financing to the real economy fell continuously from 91.9% in 2002 to 51.3% in 2013, implying that business flew away from banks towards shadow banks over time.
10 The non-bank shadow banking sector is of much smaller scale than the "bank-initiated" shadow banking sector. Non-bank shadow banking institutions include micro-finance companies that are licensed to lend in small amounts, pawn shops, third-party wealth management entities, and guarantee agencies. Very few asset management programs of mutual funds and securities companies involve in shadow banking transactions. Secularization only began to take off in 2013.
pushed business away from banks towards shadow banks. About one hundred small and regional banks were established in China by the end of 2001. Bank capital is primarily sourced from deposits. But deposit rate ceiling puts small banks in an inferior position to solicit customer deposits. This propelled small banks to engage in shadow banking business, and the high profit margins force large banks to follow suit (Hachem and Song, 2016) . The PBC tripled deposit reserve requirement ratio (RRR) from 7% in 2004 to 21% in 2011. Banks had a growing incentive to engage in shadow banking transactions to bypass the ultra-high RRR.
The global financial crisis played a remarkable role in stimulating the shadow banking growth in China. The government launched a 4-trillion-yuan stimulus package mostly in bank credit to arrest likely economic hard-landing in 2008. Once the economic growth recovered, monetary policy was tightened dramatically to crack down run-away inflation in 2010. Loans to many government sponsored long-term projects and their follow-up programs could not be rolled over when banks were withdrawing credit. Fearing that a sudden stop of credit will trigger widespread defaults and cause significant increase in nonperforming loans, banks stepped up with shadow banking operation to offset the diminishing bank credit, with implicit and explicit government endorsement.
Model Setup
This section introduces the baseline model of the dual-track credit system. It can be easily modified to resemble China's credit systems both before the rise of shadow banking and after the full interest rate liberalization in the future.
Baseline Model
The baseline model describes a dual-track credit system involving four representative agents: bank, household, state-owned enterprise (SOE), and private enterprise (PE). As shown in Figure 1 , under the control credit track, the bank receives deposit from the household and makes loan to the firms. Under the market credit track of shadow banking, the bank raises capital from the household through wealth management product (WMP) and makes trust loan to the firms at market rate. Deposit is subject to interest rate ceiling and capital reserve requirement, while WMP is not. Bank loan is limited by quota, while trust loan is not.
Previous research on dual-track reform (see, e.g., Lau, Qian and Roland (2000)) does not consider the role of intermediary in facilitating transactions. In our context, banks as financial intermediary play an active role in the financial system reform. Our model explicitly considers the intermediary's objective function together with those of credit supplier (the household) and borrowers (firms).
Key Assumptions
For the baseline model of dual-track credit system, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: The PE has higher productivity than the SOE, which is consistent with ample empirical evidence (see, e.g., Brandt and Zhu, 2000; Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2011; Liao, Liu and Wang, 2014) .
Assumption 2: Bank credit is entirely rationed to the SOE, and the PE has no access to bank loan. Brandt and Zhu (2000) show that before the financial decentralization, bank credit was only allocated to the state-owned sector during the central planning era.
After China loosened its practice from credit plan to credit control, banks began to have limited discretion to allocate a small portion of credit to the non-state sector. Without loss of generality, we still assume that, in the baseline model, only the SOE has access to bank loan. This assumption greatly simplifies the model and allows for analytical solutions. We relax this assumption in the extended version of the model for numerical analysis. The simulation results indicate that the assumption does not qualitatively affect our conclusions.
Assumption 3: We assume that under the market track of shadow banking, the SOE and PE can resell credit to each other. One important feature of dual-track financial liberalization is to allow for credit transfer among borrowers. This assumption is consistent with the practice of entrust loans in China. Banks act as intermediary to make entrust loans on behalf of large corporations, mostly SOEs (Allen et al., 2015) . Tables 1 shows that entrust loans constitute a large proportion of shadow bank credit in China. To make our model analytically tractable, we combine entrust loan and trust loan together-the SOE actually makes entrust loan to the PE, when the SOE's holding of trust loan is negative.
Bank
On the liabilities side of its balance sheet, the bank raises capital from the household through both deposit and WMP. On the assets side, the bank makes loan and trust loan to the firms. The bank maximizes the following objective function under budget constraint:
where L, D, T L, and W M P denote the amount of bank loan, deposit, trust loan, and WMP, respectively; r l , r r , r tl , r d , and r wmp denote the interest rates of loan, deposit reserve, trust loan, deposit, and WMP, respectively; α denotes reserve requirement ratio (RRR); throughout the paper, the superscript "BK" denote bank; C BK represents bank operation cost:
where δ BK l , δ BK tl , and δ BK wmp denote the coefficients of marginal operation costs in the loan, deposit, trust loan, and WMP markets, respectively. 11 Deposit interest rate, r d , equals the repressed ceiling,r d , which is artificially set by the central bank:
where r * d denotes equilibrium deposit rate in an otherwise control-free credit system.
For simplicity, we use high RRR as a proxy for control on loan volume. This simplification ensures analytical solutions in the baseline model. As an illustration, the sharp rise of RRR from 7% in 2004 to 21% in 2011 will correspond to around 15% reduction of loan volume in the absence of shadow banking. Loan volume control and RRR are substitutes in the PBC's toolbox, as can be seen from the relationship L = (1 − α)D.
In the generalized version of the model (in Section 5), we impose explicit control on loan volume quota, producing numerical simulation results consistent with the model's theoretical implications.
Firms
We denote state-owned enterprise with the superscript of "SOE" and private enterprise with "P E", respectively. Both firms have production functions that are linear in capital input. The firms have no capital endowment, and entirely rely on external financing. Their objective functions are written as
where the superscript F ∈ {SOE, P E}; ϕ F denotes marginal productivity. According to Assumption 1, ϕ P E > ϕ SOE . The firm's operation cost is expressed as
, where δ F l and δ F tl denote the coefficients of firms' marginal operation costs of loan and trust loan, respectively. A firm simultaneously determines its demand for loan and trust loan, taking into account its productivity and bank credit accessibility. Following Assumption 2, we set δ P E l = +∞, which means all bank credit is rationed to the SOE under credit control.
Household
The household invests her wealth, W , in deposit and WMP to maximize total return. Throughout the paper, the superscript "HH" denotes household. The objective function of the household is expressed as
where C HH = 1 2 (δ HH wmp W M P 2 ); δ HH wmp denotes the household's coefficient of marginal cost of engaging in the shadow bank sector. Her marginal deposit operation cost is set to be zero, for the same technical consideration as stated in Footnote 11. The household simultaneously determines the amount of investment in deposit and WMP.
Equilibrium
The financial markets are cleared when aggregate credit demand meets aggregate credit supply. Under credit controls on deposit rate and bank loan volume, the market clearing conditions are expressed as
From top to bottom, the equations are the market clearing conditions for the deposit, bank loan, trust loan, and WMP sectors, respectively. We solve the four equations to pin down the equilibrium r l , r d , r tl , and r wmp . We then solve for the agents' monetary gains using their objective functions.
Credit System in Other Transition Stages
To study the dual-track interest rate liberalization in a historical context, we also need to model China's credit system prior to the rise of shadow banking and after full interest rate liberalization. The baseline model can be easily modified to resemble China's credit systems at those times. The following illustrates how such modifications can be made.
Before the Rise of Shadow Banking
To model the credit system before the rise of shadow banking, we shut off the market track by setting the shadow banking costs infinitely large, that is, δ F tl = +∞, δ BK tl = +∞, δ BK wmp = +∞, and δ HH wmp = +∞. Given the quadratic operation cost functions in the agents' objective functions, the agents' usage of shadow banking products quickly converges to zero when these marginal cost coefficients approaches infinity. Then bank credit constitutes the sole source of capital, which is rationed to the SOE only.
After Full Interest Rate Liberalization
China has set full interest rate liberalization as an ultimate goal of financial reform. In our context, full liberalization removes the controls on deposit rate and bank loan volume, while shadow banking remains to exist. Credit price and quantity in both the bank and shadow bank sectors are market-determined. Technically, we remover d , allowing r d to be determined by demand and supply in equilibrium. Note that "single-track" liberalization, which directly removes deposit rate ceiling and loan quota in the absence of shadow banking, is a special case of full interest rate liberalization.
Theoretical Analysis
This section analyzes the effects of dual-track interest rate liberalization on aggregate output, agents' monetary payoffs, and economic efficiency. We further study the implications of full interest rate liberalization on additional output and efficiency gain.
Efficiency Gain
We first examine whether dual-track liberalization leads to gains in output and efficiency.
The bank's budget constraint is
where the subscript i = 0 for the controlled credit system prior to the dual-track reform and i = 1 for the dual-track credit system. Total credit inputed into production is
W M P 0 = 0, and W M P 1 > 0, and the household's budget constraint, we have D 1 < D 0 and K 1 > K 0 . Total credit inputed into production increases as the household shifts away from deposit to WMP, which reduces the amount of capital reserve.
The proportion of trust loan in total credit put into production, s A i ∈ [0, 1], is endogenously determined in equilibrium. The proportion of bank loan is 1−s A i . Overall productivity is the weighted average productivities of the SOE and PE:
Under the controlled credit system, the bank rations all credit to the SOE. After partial liberalization, overall productivity increases as some credit is allocated to the more productive PE under the market track of shadow banking.
Output can be expressed as the weighted average of the SOE and PE productivities times the amount of capital input into production:
It is easy to show that Y 1 > Y 0 , when K 1 > K 0 and A 1 > A 0 . Output increases through two channels combined together: (1) Productivity channel: The market track of shadow banking helps to correct the bank's credit mis-allocation problem that originally prevents the PE from accessing to credit. Aggregate productivity increases since the more productive PE sector is getting financed.
(2) Capital idolization channel: One important purpose of shadow banking is to evade high deposit reserve requirement or other excessive capital requirements. Funds flow from deposit to WMP with the rise of shadow banking, which effectively reduces capital idolization.
We have the following lemmas leading up to the result on aggregate efficiency gain: According to Lemma 2, given that the change in output ∆Y 1−0 = Y 1 −Y 0 is increasing in ϕ P E -the PE's efficiency parameter and that the change in operation cost ∆C 1−0 = C 1 −C 0 under the dual-track reform is bounded, there exists a lower boundφ P E such that
Intuitively, if the PE's productivity is sufficiently high, the rise of shadow banking can lead to Kaldor-Hicks improvement to efficiency, which means increase in aggregate output outweighs increase in aggregate cost. Hence, we summarize the above discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Dual-track interest rate liberalization leads to output gain through more efficient credit allocation and less capital idolization. In particular, shadow banking provides financing to productive and under-funded private sector. Capital idolization due to bank loan volume control diminishes. Kaldor-Hicks improvement to efficiency is achieved when increase in aggregate output exceeds bounded increase in aggregate cost.
Pareto Improvement
Kaldor-Hicks improvement is a necessary but insufficient condition for Pareto improvement. Whether the dual-track mechanism leads to Pareto improvement depends on the distribution of efficiency gain among agents. The distribution rule is determined by the equilibrium interest rates in all market sectors. If the interest rate in one sector increases, there is a transfer from credit demander to credit supplier. This section demonstrates the existence of Pareto improvement and the conditions for it under the dual-track interest rate liberalization. The idea is that the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency gain can be distributed properly to all agents through financial markets, which creates no losers in the reform.
We present the following lemmas in preparation for the proof of the existence of Pareto improvement under the dual-track reform mechanism:
Lemma 3. The endogenously-determined trust loan rate relates to the productivities of the SOE and PE in following ways:
(i) If r tl > ϕ SOE and credit transfer is allowed under the market track, the SOE's optimal strategy is to resale credit to the PE in the form of entrust loan.
(ii) Given that ϕ P E > ϕ SOE , there exists a scenario, where ϕ P E > r tl > ϕ SOE ;
(iii) Rate and size of trust loan, r tl and T L, increase as ϕ P E increases.
See Appendix A.2 for proof of Lemma 3.
The household and PE are unconditionally better off in dual-track interest rate liberalization. In particular, WMP presents a "take-it-or-leave-it" option to the household.
Consider an extreme case in which WMP rate is below deposit rate, the household can ignore WMP and continues to invest in deposit only. Since WMP allows the bank to gain additional profit by evading loan quota and reserve requirement, the bank is willing to pay higher WMP rate than deposit rate. Investment in WMP leads to higher return for the household. As long as the gain of switching from deposit to WMP exceeds the switching cost, which is almost zero in reality, the household benefits from the dual-track liberalization.
The PE is also presented with a "take-it-or-leave-it" option of trust loan under the market track. It can avoid being worse off by declining to participate in the shadow banking market. Hence, trust loan rate cannot be higher than the PE's marginal productivity.
Using Lemma 4 below, one can show that the PE is better off as long as its production gain exceeds its operation cost associated with trust loan.
Lemma 4. Given a function f (x) = ax − bx 2 with a > 0, ∀x 0 ∈ (0, a 2b ), ∃f (x 0 ) > 0.
To analyze whether the SOE and bank benefit from dual-track liberalization, first let us consider a hypothetical single-track interest rate reform. The single-track reform leads to an increase in deposit rate as the rate ceiling is removed. The bank's financing cost increases, leading to a decrease in profit. The SOE's profit margin also falls as bank loan rate increases with deposit rate. This result suggests that SOEs and banks are potential losers in interest rate reform. It also explains why interest rate reform has faced tremendous ex ante opposition from these powerful institutions.
How to compensate the potential losses of SOEs and banks plays a critical role in the success of interest rate reform. The dual-track mechanism provides a solution to allow SOEs and banks to participate in shadow banking and share efficiency gain. In particular,
SOEs resale credit to PEs to make a profit, banks issue WMP and make trust loan to make a profit.
Proposition 1 implies that the efficiency gain is positively related to the PE productivity.
Equilibrium interest rates determine efficiency gain distribution among agents along the credit supply chain. Since the total reform cost is limited in our model setup, there exists a lower bound of PE productivity to generate sufficient efficiency gain such that the SOE and bank are compensated adequately. Another way of stating the result is: there exists a set of equilibrium interest rates to make no agents worse off in the reform. We have the following proposition: See Appendix A.3 for proof. Numerical analysis in Section 5 shows that with reasonable PE productivity and realistic economic parameters, the dual-track interest rate liberalization leads to Pareto improvement intra-temporally and inter-temporally. Liberalized productivity leads to sufficient increase in aggregate output, benefiting all agents along the credit supply chain. A reform strategy with intra-temporal Pareto improvement is admittedly free of ex post regression. Regardless of whether the policy maker is long reigning or not, and whether the agents are patient or not, the dual-track mechanism has a known advantage in achieving creditable expectation of "reform without losers".
The dual-track reforms in Chinese agricultural and industrial sectors rely on forced execution of the plan track to guarantee Pareto improvement (Lau, Qian and Roland, 2000) , which is not feasible in financial sector reform. Financial reform involves powerful intermediary that is under the control of the government but also has some degree of discretion (Brandt and Zhu, 2000) . Pareto improvement is achieved through an allocation mechanism determined by equilibrium credit prices, which are jointly established by market forces and credit controls. Pareto improvement does not require forced execution of the control track. On the other hand, it does depend on whether there is sufficient productivity gain to compensate reform losses of SOEs and banks.
Full Interest Rate Liberalization
China has set full interest rate liberalization as one of its ultimate goals of financial reforms.
This section aims to shed light on the implications of dual-track reform on future full interest rate liberalization, which interacts with in-depth reforms in the banking sector and SOEs. Dual-track mechanism introduces a new market track without restructuring the control track. Full interest rate liberalization proceeds to remove the deposit rate ceiling in our model, liberalizing the control track while keeping shadow banking in place.
Similar to the development of Proposition 1, the total output during dual-track or full liberalization is in the same form of Equation 6 (reproduced here):
where i = 1 denotes dual-track liberalization; i = 2 denotes full liberalization.
Equation A-2 in Appendix shows that trust loan rate r tl increases as deposit rate r d increases, leading to greater credit resale from the SOE to the PE, i.e., T L SOE
Hence, the share of trust loan in total credit s A 2 > s A 1 . Given that ϕ SOE < ϕ P E , the weighted-average productivity, represented by the first term on the RHS of Equation 6, increases. Full liberalization increases the repressed deposit rate to its equilibrium level, i.e., r d 2 > r d 1 =r d . Based on the market clearing condition for the deposit market in Equation 5, we have D 2 > D 1 . Credit injected into production, represented by the second term on the RHS of Equation 6, diminishes after full liberalization, i.e., W − αD 2 < W − αD 1 .
The positive effect of rising productivity and the negative effect of falling credit supply on aggregate output offset each other. As a result, full interest rate liberalization may not necessarily lead to output gain or efficiency gain. We have Corollary 1. Full interest rate liberalization may not necessarily achieve additional efficiency gain in the presence of high reserve requirement and bank credit mis-allocation in favor of SOEs. More capital flows back to the banking sector after full liberalization, leading to greater capital idolization and diminishing PE financing.
As the interest rate controls being removed, some funds flow back to the bank sector.
Capital idolization increases as more deposit is subject to reserve requirement. The removal of interest rate distortion effectively magnifies bank credit mis-allocation in favor of less efficient SOEs, which adversely impacts aggregate output. Therefore, full interest rate liberalization may not necessarily achieve its intended goal to gain additional efficiency, when there exist multiple distortions in the credit system.
Numerical Simulation
Our baseline model imposes simplifying assumptions to ensure analytical solutions. This section extends the baseline model, removing some technical restrictions, to better resemble the China's financial system in reality. Numerical analysis not only verifies the robustness of the analytical results, but also provides additional insights through comparative statics. are set to generate interest rates and asset features consistent with corresponding empirical stylized facts, e.g., the ranking of interest rates follows r tl > r l > r b > r wmp > r d . As reported in Table 3 , the baseline model yields trust loan rate of 13.7%, bank loan rate of 9.4%, bond rate of 5.8%, WMP rate of 5.1%, and deposit rate of 3.2%. The implied interest rates closely resemble their observed counterparts, suggesting that our selections of parameter values are reasonable.
Extended Baseline Model

Calibration
The key parameters in the extended baseline model include the coefficients of marginal operation costs, whose values cannot be accurately pinned down. We focus on measuring the relative values (or rankings) of different costs. To the bank, the marginal cost of deposit (δ BK d = 0.01) should be lower than the marginal cost of loan (δ BK l = 0.02), because it is more costly to manage loans. It is even more costly to engage in shadow banking as the market is less transparent. We set the marginal cost of WMP two times of the deposit cost (δ BK wmp = 0.02). The marginal cost of trust loan (δ BK tl = 0.15) is much higher than the 12 We assume that the PE has no access to the bond market. This assumption is consistent to the fact that only large and listed firms can publicly issue corporate bonds in China, and that few private firms can issue bonds through private placement.
marginal cost of bank loan. 13
For the SOE, the marginal cost of bond is higher than that of bank loan (δ SOE b = 0.08 versus δ SOE l = 0.02); trust loan (δ SOE tl = 0.05) is more costly than bank loan, but less costly than bond. In the shadow bank sector, we assume that the SOE and the PE are equally competitive, i.e., δ SOE tl = δ P E tl = 0.05.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that investing in deposit is cost-free for the household. Investing in bond is costly with δ HH b = 0.15, but purchasing WMP is less costly than bond with δ HH wmp = 0.05. The ratio of CBF to aggregate output was roughly 4% in China in 2013. Hence, we set the household's endowed wealth W = 2.4, and CBF = 0.1. We set the degree of loan volume control, k 1 , and the degree of deposit rate repression, k 2 , to be 90% and 80% of their market equilibrium levels, respectively.
Robustness check indicates that our conclusions are not sensitive to the values of k 1 and k 2 in reasonable ranges. 14
Analysis
This section presents the numerical results to verify that our theoretical findings are robust in a more realistic setting. It provides additional insights on how dual-track interest rate liberalization affects the efficiency gain and profit sharing. 13 The selection of marginal cost values is less strict and by no means perfect. These selected values nevertheless reflect considerations for market accessibility, transparency, liquidity, expected default loss, and other frictions. Ranking of these cost values is in general consistent with the intuition and empirical observations. We do not introduce the bank's operation cost for bond holding because it is relatively costless for the bank to hold bond (issued by the SOE in our model) and also to ensure equal numbers of unknowns and equations. Untabulated sensitivity analysis shows that our findings are robust for a reasonable but broad range of cost values.
14 We set deposit rate ceiling and loan quota in percentage to their control-free equilibrium levels for the following considerations: First, the market-determined equilibrium deposit interest rate and loan quota are perhaps the most meaningful benchmarks to measure the degree of restriction; second, the percentage measures of policy distortion are direct and easy to interpret; third, they are consistent with the fact that these restriction are periodically adjusted for economic development needs; furthermore, alternative fixed controls on deposit rate ceiling and loan quota tend to be more restrictive and magnify the effects of shadow banking in our favor, hence not changing our conclusions, only enhancing them.
Interest Rates and Financial Products
Interest rates generally increase after the dual-track liberalization. Deposit rate repression has an anchoring effect on all other rates, given banks' dominance in the controlled credit system. Introducing shadow banking sector tends to weaken such a repressing-anchoring effect. Table 3 reports that deposit rate, r d , increases from 2.1% to 3.2%, which is comparable to the observed deposit rate of 3.0% in China. Even if the degree of deposit rate repression remains unchanged, deposit rate still increases significantly, because of the spillover effect from the shadow banking sector. The equilibrium WMP rate is 5.1%, which is significantly higher than deposit rate. The bank loan rate, r l , increases from 9.0% to 9.4% after the reform, somewhat higher than the observed (official) bank loan rate of 7.2%. The model implied bond rate since dual-track liberalization is 5.8%, very close to the observed bond rate of 6.0% in China.
A substantial portion of credit flows into the shadow bank sector. The model-implied amount of bank loan is 1.18, which is comparable to the ratio of bank loan to gross domestic production (GDP) of 1.20 in China in 2013. The model-implied amounts of bond and deposit are 0.52 and 1.84, respectively. In comparison, the observed ratios of bond and deposit to GDP in China are 0.56 and 1.76, respectively, in 2013 . The implied deposit reserve decreases from 0.34 to 0.28 after the shadow banking emerges, implying less capital idolization. The close resemblance between model-implied interest rates and financial quantities to their observed counterparts suggests that our model calibration is reasonable.
Efficiency Gain
Dual-track liberalization creates efficiency gains through credit transfer from the SOE to PE. Table 3 reports that the SOE's holding of trust loan is negative -0.74, suggesting that less efficient SOE acts as a credit supplier under the market credit track of shadow banking.
The more efficient PE is willing to finance at higher interest rates, who's credit demand pushes trust loan rate above the SOE's productivity. The SOE in turn optimally acts as capital supplier. This result echoes the finding of Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) that such a de facto privatization process has fueled China's economic growth in the past decades. As shown in Table 3 , the total credit injected in production-loan, trust loan, and bond-is 2.16 and 2.22, respectively, before and after the dual-track reform. Therefore, shadow banking helps to increase capital input into the production, and consequently, to increase the aggregate output.
Pareto Improvement
We measure the welfare gain from dual-track liberalization as the difference between the aggregate monetary payoffs of all agents before and after the rising of shadow banking. Table 4 shows that the aggregate efficiency increases by 41.8% (from 18.92 × 10 −2 to 26.82 × 10 −2 ) with the rise of shadow banking. Dual-track liberalization reduces the size of deposit reserve by attracting households to invest int WMP. More capital enters into the production of efficient private sector, leading to an increase in aggregate output.
As detailed in Table 4 , the household's payoff increases by 55.4% (from 5.27 × 10 −2 to 8.19 × 10 −2 ), as the household diversifies investment from deposit into WMP. The bank's payoff increases by 19.4% (from 6.23 × 10 −2 to 7.44 × 10 −2 ). Off-balance sheet capital raised through WMP is not subject to reserve requirement, and trust loan investment is not subject to bank loan quota. The payoffs of the SOE and the PE increase by 8.6% and 70.5% (from 2.34 × 10 −2 and 5.08 × 10 −2 to 2.54 × 10 −2 and 8.66 × 10 −2 , respectively), with the rise of shadow banking. Shadow banking transactions enable banks and SOEs to benefit from the production increase of PE and, in return, to support the dual-track interest rate reform. The numerical results confirm the implication of Proposition 2 that, if implemented properly, dual-track interest rate liberalization can lead to Pareto improvement, that is, creating no losers in the reform.
Comparative Statics
We investigate how the efficiency gain of dual-track interest rate liberalization is related to the degree of deposit rate repression, the degree of bank loan restriction, and bond market inefficiency. Panels A and B in Figure 2 show that the efficiency gain is positively correlated to the degree of bank loan volume constraint (1 − k 1 ) and the degree of deposit rate repression (1 − k 2 when k 2 in the range of [0.9 − 1.0]). The more distorted the bank financing channel, the greater value can dual track liberalization contribute. 15 Panel C in Figure 2 shows that shadow banking-induced gain is positive related to the inefficiency of the bond market. The Chinese bond market grew rapidly in recent years but still suffers from low efficiency. Bond issuance process is lengthy, costly, and subject to high qualification standards. PEs, especially SMEs, virtually have no access to the bond market. Hence, shadow banking leads to greater efficiency gain when bond market has more frictions.
Full Interest Rate Liberalization
China will eventually embrace full interest rate liberalization. However, as our theoretical analysis points out, moving from dual-track to full liberalization may or may not bring additional welfare gain. Table 4 shows that aggregate payoff slightly increases after full interest rate liberalization, specifically, by 0.3% (from 26.82 × 10 −2 to 26.90 × 10 −2 ).
Notably the bank's payoff actually decreases by 22.5% (from 7.44 × 10 −2 to 5.77 × 10 −2 ), while the household's payoff increases by 22.8% from (8.19 × 10 −2 to 10.06 × 10 −2 ). The removal of interest rate repression shifts more financing from WMP to deposit, which magnifies the credit mis-allocation as banks ration credit to less efficient SOEs.
Panel A of Figure 3 shows that aggregate gain is positively correlated to the ratio of SOE loan financing cost to PE loan financing cost. The evidence suggests that additional output gain can be achieved when the implicit government guarantee is removed and banks no longer ration credit in favor of SOEs. While, Panel B of Figure 3 depicts that aggregate gain increases with SOE productivity increasing. Overall, whether additional gain can be achieved by fully liberalizing the interest rates critically depends on the implementation of bank and SOE sector reforms, in particular, improving SOE operational efficiency and reducing bank credit rationing.
Full interest rate liberalization does not crowd out shadow banking, which still serves as an effective channel for banks to evade high reserve requirement. From the capital utilization efficiency perspective, shadow banking is advantageous over commercial banking in reducing capital idolization. On one hand, shadow banking provides firms with a valuable alternative credit channel in the face of underdeveloped bond market. On the other side, high transaction cost and opaqueness of the shadow bank sector undermines its importance in a fully liberalized financial system. Vishny (2012, 2013) argue that shadow banking exposes the financial sector to greater systemic risk. In our simple framework, various risk considerations are reflected in the transaction costs for each agents holding various financial assets and ultimately reflected in various equilibrium interest rates. It is important to examine the potential systemic risk from shadow banking introduced by dual-track liberalization, however, the task may be out of the scope of this paper. We leave it to future research.
Further Discussion
There exists a mis-perception that recently shadow banking fuels irrational and excessive investments in China. The over-investment problem is in fact driven by the cheap credit supply mainly to the SOEs due to the interest rate repression policy. Even in the absence of shadow banking, easy credit finds its way through other channels, such as bank loan and government planning, into the real economy. Hence, the problems are created by the preexisting distortions within China's credit system rather than by shadow banking per se.
The market track of shadow banking has credit prices and quantities determined by supply and demand, which moderates, rather than, exacerbates the over-investment problem.
Conclusion
Shadow banking provides a pragmatic dual-track liberalization solution to China's controlled interest rate policy, which underlies phenomenal structural imbalance and distortion in the Chinese economy. In contrast to the developed economies, shadow banking in China mainly helps banks to evade the excessive regulatory controls on deposit rate and credit volume, with tacit government endorsement. In this sense, shadow banking in China essentially constitutes a covert effort of interest rate liberalization.
Using a market equilibrium model, we show that the dual-track liberalization approachintroducing the market shadow bank track along side of the control bank credit track-can lead to efficiency gain through correction of credit mis-allocation and reduction in capital idolization. Pareto improvement can be achieved as banks and state owned enterprises (SOEs) participate in shadow banking and share the efficiency gain. Therefore, dual-track interest rate liberalization can face the least opposition ex ante.
China will embrace full interest rate liberalization in its on-going financial reforms.
Evidence shows that full interest rate liberalization may not lead to additional efficiency gain, since it magnifies the adverse effect of bank credit mis-allocation in favor of less efficient SOEs. Capital idolization also increases when high reserve requirement ratio continues to exist. Market-oriented monetary policy and regulatory framework need to be established under a fully liberalized credit system. The market track of shadow banking nevertheless prepares the central bank as well as other agents for such a complex transition.
Appendix
A.1 Market Clearing Conditions
A.1.1 Baseline Model
The baseline model captures the most simplified environment with no direct financing approach (i.e., bond market or equity market) from the household to the firm, and no money injection from the central bank to the commerical bank. There are four agents in the baseline model, i.e., the household, the bank, the SOE, and the PE. The SOE and the PE constitute the heterogenous firm sector.
(1) To better demonstrate the market clearing conditions before and after the rise of shadow banking, as well as before and after full interest rate liberalization, we consider the credit system with shadow banking after full liberalization as a benchmark. There are four markets, i.e., loan market, deposit market, trust loan market, and wealth management product market. Traditional banking business is free from additional financial regulation. 16 Market clearing conditions are given by
subject to binding balance sheets of the household and the bank, respectively:
First-order conditions (FOCs) of each agent can be easily solved by Lagrangian equations, hence we omit them for the sake of simplificity. By substituting these FOCs into the equation system above, we have
where four equations jointly solve the four unknown variables, i.e., r d , r l , r wmp , and r tl .
(2) While, the credit system with shadow banking before full liberalization (the "dualtrack liberalization" credit system) is slightly different with the above equation system. That is, there exist a interest rate ceiling that distorts the deposit market. Given an artifically lower deposit rate (r d ), the equilibrium deposit size will be lowered down, which affects the other markets through asset reallocation approach. Market clearing conditions are given by
Similarly, we have
(3) The credit system in the absence of shadow banking only contains two markets, i.e., deposit market and loan market. Agents have almost no freedom in asset allocation. Specifically, the household has to allocate all their wealth endowment to deposit, the bank's optimization problem is reduced to a rigid balance sheet, and only the SOE can get access to the bank loan. Market clearing conditions are given by
It is worth noting that the propositions in Section 4 do not require the equilibria in all credit systems to be fully solved. Instead, we only need to know the direction of capital re-allocation of each agent across stages, and the change in equilibrium interest rates, as demonstrated in Section 4. Moreover, the setting of convex operation cost function is simple, reasonable and intuitive, which leads to inner solutions that feature agents' optimal allocation among different financial assets when facing structural shocks. 17
A.1.2 Extended Baseline Model
In Section 5, we conduct numerical simulation based on an extended baseline model with bond market, central bank, as well as explicit loan quota. The corresponding model framework is presented in Panel B of Figure 1 . Besides new market (bond market), new agent (the central bank), and new type of financial repression (explicit bank loan quota), new features of the extended baseline model further include the following: (i) The household can obtain access to corporate bond market as a direct financing approach; (ii) The SOE and the PE compete not only in trust loan market, but also in bank loan market, although with different marginal costs; (iii) For the bank, the purchase of bond is regarded as the benchmark marginal cost parameter because fixed income trade is more flexible and costless compared to deposit, and also for the technical reason as stated in Footnote 11.
(1) Following a similar manner, we derive the market clearing conditions for the credit system with shadow banking after full interest rate liberalization:
By substituting the FOCs of each agent into the equation system above, we have
where CBF denotes the size of central bank fund which is exogenously given. The five equations above jointly solve the following five unknown variables, i.e., r d , r l , r b , r wmp , and r tl .
(2) The credit system before full liberalization ("dual-track interest rate liberalization credit system") still have two types of explicit financial repressions, i.e., deposit interest rate ceiling and bank loan quota. Hence, market clearing conditions are given by
whereL = k 1 · L * , L * is the equilibrium loan size under an otherwise control-free economy; similarly,r d = k 2 · r * d , r * d is the equilibrium deposit rate under an otherwise control-free economy. k 1 ∈ [0, 1] and k 2 ∈ [0, 1] capture the degree of bank loan volume control, and deposit rate repression, respectively. The lower k 1 and k 2 , the tighter the controls will be.
By substituting the FOCs of each agent, we have
(3) Market clearing conditions in the absence of shadow banking are very similar to those in the baseline model. Hence we omit them here for the sake of simplicity.
A.2 Proof for Lemma 3
The proof for Lemma 3 is straightforward.
Proof. (i) Obviously. If r tl > ϕ SOE , the interior optimal strategy for SOE to hold T L is T L = ϕ SOE −r tl δ SOE tl < 0. On the other hand, suppose SOE does not resell credit in the trust loan market given r tl > ϕ SOE , a marginal resale, ∆T L, could lead to SOE's efficiency gain,
, we have ∆Π SOE > 0. That is, T L ≤ 0 is not an optimal strategy for SOE given r tl > ϕ SOE .
(ii) Suppose not, we will have r tl > ϕ P E > ϕ SOE , which implies T L SOE < 0, T L P E < 0. together with T L BK > 0, we will obtain T L BK − T L SOE − T L P E > 0, which happens to be a contradiction to the market clearing condition of trust loan market, T L BK = T L SOE + T L P E .
(iii) As stated in Equation 5, the market clearing condition for trust loan market is
where m 1 , m 2 , 1 − m 1 − m 2 ∈ [0, 1] are constant. 18 Hence, r tl is increasing in ϕ P E . Equilibrium T L will be pinned down correspondingly, i.e.,
Thus, T L is increasing in ϕ P E .
A.3 Proof for Proposition 2
We prove that the rise of shadow banking could conditionally make all the four representative agents (The household, the SOE, the PE, and the bank) better off, one by one.
Proof. (i) The household: The market clearing condition of the WMP market is given by 
Recalling r wmp 1 > r d 1 = r d 0 =r d , we can easily prove Π HH 1 > Π HH 0 based on Equation A-6. The household's gain from shadow banking is calculated as
Therefore, the household unconditionally gets better off after the rise of shadow banking.
(ii) The SOE: Allowing credit resale between the SOE and the PE, the SOE's aggregate gains before and after the rise of shadow banking are given by 19 Since the bank's budget constraint is binding before and after the reform, i.e.,
19 According to Equation 5, the loan market clearing condition is given by
Hence, r l is a fixed interest rate before and after the rise of shadow banking.
Let us consider the change in the SOE's capital operation cost,
The SOE's gain from the rise of shadow banking is:
That is, if φ SOE is sufficiently large to yield r tl > ϕ SOE , 20 the SOE will benefit from the rise of shadow banking.
(iii) The PE: The PE's gain from the rise of shadow banking is given by
Thus, the PE unconditionally gets better off from the rise of shadow banking.
(iv) The bank: The bank's objective function is given by
20 Based on Equation A-2, the sufficient and necessary condition for r tl > ϕ SOE is
Correspondingly, the bank's gain from shadow banking is ∆Π BK 1−0 = r l 1 L 1 + (r r α −r d )D 1 + r tl 1 T L BK
Lamma 3 indicates that r tl and T L are increasing in ϕ P E . As we proved previously, (1) r l 0 = r l 1 ; (2) ∆C BK 1−0 = C BK 1 − C BK 0 is bounded; (3) ∆Π BK 1−0 is increasing in ϕ P E . Thus, based on Lemmas 1 and 2, there exists a constantφ P E BK that yields Π BK 1 > Π BK 0 for any ϕ P E >φ P E BK . The bank will gain from the rise of shadow banking given a sufficiently large ϕ P E . Therefore, the household and the PE unconditionally get better off. While, the SOE and the bank could get better off conditional on a sufficiently large ϕ P E . In other words, shadow banking could lead to Pareto improvement given a sufficiently large ϕ P E . This table reports the equilibrium interest rates and financial asset sizes at different stages of the interest rate liberalization process. The three stages are before interest rate liberalization (past), dual-track reform with shadow banking (present), and full interest rate liberalization (future), respectively. The variables r l , r tl , r b , r d , and r wmp denote the interest rates of loan, trust loan, bond, deposit, and WMP, respectively. The variables, L, T L, B, D, and W M P denote the sizes of loan, trust loan, bond, deposit, and WMP, respectively. Short dash, "-", indicates that the corresponding asset does not exist in the model, or is unobserved. This figure reports the relations between efficiency gain from dual-track liberalization with shadow banking and key credit system characteristics, including the degree of bank loan volumn constraint (k 1 ), the degree of deposit rate repression (k 2 ), and bond market inefficiency (δ SOE b
). Efficiency gain is measured as the difference between the aggregate gains in the presence and absence of shadow banking.
Figure 3: Full Interest Rate Liberalization
This figure reports the relations between efficiency gain from dual-track liberalization with shadow banking and key firm characteristics, including the ratio of SOE loan financing cost to PE loan financing cost (δ SOE l /δ P E l ) and the ratio of the SOE's productivity to the PE's (ϕ SOE /ϕ P E ). Efficiency gain is measured as the difference between the aggregate gains before and after full interest rate liberalization in the presence of shadow banking.
